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1 Background
Explicit in‡ation targets have existed in Colombia since the early nineties1
. The Colombian authorities announced a quantitative in‡ation target for
the …rst time in 1991. The announcement was made by the Minister of
Finance, at a time when there was no clear distinction between the tasks of
the central bank and those ofthe government with respect tomacroeconomic
management, nor there was any autonomy in the design and execution of
monetary policy.
In1991, anewConstitutionassignedthe designand conduct ofmonetary,
exchange, and credit policies exclusively to the Board of Directors of Banco
de la República and made the central bank independent from the central
government. According to the Constitution, ”The State, through Banco de
la República must preserve the purchasing power of currency”. In addition
1This section is based on (Uribe et al., 1999).
3to the constitutional mandate, in 1992 the Central Bank Law statedthat the
Board of Directors must announce each year a quantitative in‡ation target.
The reduction of in‡ation in Colombia has faced several hurdles. To
begin, the introduction of explicit in‡ation targets in Colombia had two
special features. First, unlike other countries, the in‡ation target was not
initially announced as part of a policy framework to achieve price stability.
Second, there was a marked deviation between observed in‡ation and the
…rst announced target. Thus, in‡ation targeting in Colombia started with
low credibility and confusion about its nature and operational meaning.
Throughout the period of in‡ation targeting there has beenan expansive
…scal policy. NFPS expenditure rose from 24.4% in 1990of GDP to 34.8% in
2000. This increase has been …nanced with tax hikes, privatization revenues
and a large build-up of domestic and external public debt. Even though
there has not been direct loans from the central bank to …nance the public
de…cit, the …scal stance has conditioned the execution, credibility and re-
sults of monetary policy. When foreign …nance was abundant, …scal policy
implied pressures toward a real appreciation of the currency in a country
characterized by a strong lobby for depreciation. When foreign …nance was
scarce, the …scal stance forced the adjustment of the external de…cit on the
private sector.
In addition, it must be remembered that Colombia began targeting in-
‡ation after more than twenty years of moderate in‡ation. Between 1972
and1992 the in‡ation rate hovered around the 22-23% level and Colombians
were able to live with this in‡ation throughthe informal or formal indexation
of wages, taxes, mortgages and the prices of some …nancial assets.
Low credibility and widespread backward-looking indexation are known
to increase the short-run costs of disin‡ation. Furthermore, in a context
of widespread indexation and a long history of moderate in‡ation, society
has been particularly reluctant to accept the short-run costs of disin‡ation.
Hence, there has been no strong political and public support for in‡ation
reduction.
In fact, in‡ation has fallen gradually and only after 1997 it was at or
below the announced targets (Figure 1). The process of disin‡ation has
taken place over a complete business cycle (Figure 1), starting in 1990 when
CPI in‡ation was 30% and continuing today with in‡ation levels close to
the 8% target for 2001, in the midst of a slow recovery from the …rst output
contraction in decades. In the early years of this period, in‡ation reduction
was accompaniedby a real appreciation ofthe currency (Figure 1). However,
the sharpest drop in in‡ation occurred between 1998 and 1999, when it fell
from 16.7% to 9.3% and, at the same time, output declined by 4.2%.









































Figure 1: In‡ation, in‡ationtargets, economic activity and thereal exchange
rate
52 The Monetary Policy Strategy in Colombia
Between 1992 and 1999 monetary policy was conducted on the basis of an
intermediate monetary target and a crawling band for the exchange rate.
The in‡ation target was used to compute the slope of the exchange rate
band and the growth rate of the expected path for M1 or the monetary
base. This framework was set up onthe grounds of a relatively stable money
demand in Colombia and after decades of a crawling peg regime. It was
believed that the width of the band (§7 per cent for most of the period)
would allow the exchange rate to absorb most of the shocks to the foreign
exchange market andwould minimize the con‡ict betweenthe monetary and
exchange rate targets. At any rate, at some point it was announced that, in
case of con‡ict, the highest priority would be given to the monetary targets.
In reality, the targets for the monetary aggregates were missed or changed
on several occasions, while the exchange rate band was appreciated once in
late 1994, and devalued twice between 1998 and 1999, following the Russian
crisis and the loss of credibility of …scal and monetary policy.
The …rst elements of an in‡ation targeting strategy, beside the targets
themselves, were introduced in 1995, when several models for forecasting
in‡ation were developed and a monthly internal In‡ation Report started
to be produced. In December 1998 the In‡ation Report began to be pub-
lished quarterly. With time, the Report acquired growing importance in the
decision-making process of the Board of Directors.
In September 1999 the currency was allowed to ‡oat following a signif-
icant real depreciation within the bands system. Structural reforms had
already taken place: the current account de…cits had been stabilized; the …-
nancial system had been strengthened and Colombia had entered a program
withthe IMF that aimedto correct structural problems with public …nances.
Shortly after this change was introduced, a clear set of rules for central bank
intervention was set up and announced, so that the ‡oating regime could be
as ”clean” as possible. The move to a ‡oating regime simpli…ed the mon-
etary policy strategy, allowing the central bank to concentrate on in‡ation
targeting.
Thus, at that point, three out of four basic requirements of in‡ation tar-
geting (Masson, Savastano and Sharma (1997)) were present in Colombia:
the …rst one, an explicit in‡ation target; the second one, priority of the in-
‡ation target over any other objective of monetary policy, and the third one,
the existence of at least instrument independence for the central bank. A
fourth requirement, namely technical ability to predict in‡ation reasonably
and to understand the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, had
plenty of room for improvement at the time. In fact, the gap between the
in‡ation target in 1999 (15%) and the actual …gure for that year (9.3%) is
6very telling about the di¢culties facing those in charge of forecasting in‡a-
tion and developing knowledge about the transmission channels. In the case
of Colombia, the long history of moderate in‡ation and the recent experi-
ence with disin‡ation made any statistical modeling of these channels a very
hard task.
At the same time, some evidence kept pointing to the fact that mone-
tary aggregates (particularly narrow aggregates) exhibited stable long run
relationships with prices and output. Recent evidence seems to con…rm that
assessment. For example, as documented by Julio (2001), there is a cointe-
grating relationship between prices, output and the monetary base in a VEC
system. In these relationship no variable is excluded, prices are found to be
weakly endogenous and the monetary base weakly exogenous. However the
monetary base explains only a small fraction of the variability of prices, as
re‡ected by the impulse-response function and the variance decomposition
exercise. Another study by Otero and Ramírez (2001) follows the method-
ology employed by Surrey (1989) and Joselius (1992) in order to determine
the importance of monetary, external and labor market factors in explaining
in‡ation in Colombia. They found that monetary disequilibrium and excess
demand variables are the most important explanatory variables (after the
auto-regressive terms) in the in‡ation equations for the 1980-2000 period.
Hence, by 1999 when the exchange rate started to ‡oat, the central bank
sta¤ and the Board of Directors found themselves in a situation in which the
in‡ation forecasting ability and the knowledge of the transmission mecha-
nisms of monetary policy were not very reliable, while a stable relationship
between money, output and prices seemedtopersist. Then, the Board of Di-
rectors of Banco de la República decided to follow a strategy of ”transition”
toward in‡ation targeting. According to this strategy, shifts in the stance
of monetary policy will be triggered either by clear signals about increased
probability of missing the in‡ation target coming from the In‡ation Report
(particularly from the forecast models), or by signi…cant deviations of the
monetary base from its ”reference line”. The latter is a path for the mone-
tary base constructed on the basis of the in‡ation target and estimated to
be compatible with the achievement of that target, once the lagged e¤ects
of past monetary behavior are taken into account. It was also announced
that if the monetary base deviated from its reference line and the Board of
Directors did not take any action, the reasons will be clearly explained to
the public, presumably on the grounds of the information coming from the
In‡ation Report.
So, the monetary base was in e¤ect abandoned as the o¢cial interme-
diate target, although it continued to receive considerable emphasis in the
policy decision process, while the forecasting ability and the knowledge of
the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy improved to the point of
7being perceived as reliable by the bank’s sta¤ and its Board of Directors.
This system has worked well so far. InFebruary 2000, for example, monetary
policy was rightly tightened after the monetary base exceeded its ”reference
line” for a reason that could not be related to a shift in money demand. On
that occasion, the information included in the In‡ation Report did not sig-
nal the need of such a movement. On several other occasions, the monetary
base has exceeded its ”reference line” because of the e¤ects of the …nancial
transaction tax introduced in late 1998. At those times, the stance of mon-
etary policy has not been changed on the basis of the conclusion extracted
from the In‡ation Report and the reason has been clearly explained to the
public.
At the same time, a small macro model describing the main transmis-
sion mechanisms of monetary policy (the ”Modelo de Mecanismos de Trans-
misión” (MMT)) was being developed and improved, andhas recently begun
to be usedinthe preparation ofthe In‡ationReport, for forecastingin‡ation
and growth and also for policy analysis. Other models of the transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy, e.g. the credit channel, are in development.
On the other hand, there has been a considerable e¤ort towards improving
the forecasting ability of the bank’s sta¤, as it will presented in detail below.
As this process and the related research agenda show progress, the strategy
of monetary policy will move faster toward pure in‡ation targeting.
Operationally, the adoption of the new strategy after ‡oating the ex-
change rate has been compatible with a policy of decreasing the volatility of
the interbank overnight interest rate by means of a gradual narrowing of the
policy rate range. This movement will probably improve the transmission of
shifts in the policy stance to the longer term interest rates and, ultimately,
to in‡ation.
3 Operational Issues
3.1 The Nature of the Targets
3.1.1 The Price Index
The Colombian monetary authorities chose to use all-items CPI in de…ning
the in‡ation target2. Prices of volatile items or energy prices are not ex-
cluded from that index. The rationale is that ”headline” CPI is the most
widely known and the best-understood index. Thus, the use of the CPI fa-
cilitates communication with the public on the main objective of monetary
policy. Moreover, prices, wages and …nancial contracts have traditionally
been linked to total CPI. Therefore, it is assumed that any other measure
2This section is based in (Uribe et al., 1999).
8of in‡ation will not receive public support or serve as a guideline for eco-
nomic decisions. The same applies to the idea of introducing some caveats
to enable deviations form the targets in the event that these are caused by
factors beyond the control of central bank.
In practice, the Board of Directors has often based its policy decisions on
the behavior and forecasts of measures of core in‡ation. This has been par-
ticularly the case when identi…able temporary supply shocks hit the headline
index (e.g. food price shocks). On these occasions, the Board has opted to
explain its actions to the public, in these cases the results have been sat-
isfactory. Once the credibility of monetary policy has been enhanced, this
practice can be conducted more easily. Nevertheless, there are still doubts
as to the appropriate use of measures of underlying in‡ation. Although the
Bank has identi…eda small group of indicators for core in‡ation that seem to
…lter out short-term supply shocks adequately, the Board and the technical
sta¤ do not have a strong opinion about whether one of these indicators can
(or should) be adopted as the target of monetary policy. If a decision were
to be taken, it is not clear which of the measures of underlying in‡ation
should be chosen.
3.1.2 The targeting horizon
By law, each year the Board of Directors has to announce its quantita-
tive in‡ation target for the following year. Until 1997 the announcements
were made as late as December of November. Since then, in‡ation targets
have been informed with increasing anticipation. For example, the target
for 2002 was announced in November 2000 and the target for 2003 will be
probably announced in November 2001. This has been a clear improvement
on the previous practice, provided that there is evidence that the Banco de
la República’s policy actions a¤ect in‡ation with long lags, with the main
e¤ects occurring after six to eight quarters. Ifthat evidence is correct, short-
horizon in‡ation targets in Colombia might not be achievable by monetary
policy and, therefore, may be interpreted by the markets as simple forecasts
of in‡ation instead of policy commitments.
3.1.3 Point target
Until 2002 in‡ation targets in Colombia had always been formulated as
point targets. It was considered that a single …gure provided a better guide
than a range for the formation of in‡ation expectations and communicated
greater commitment by the central bank to reach its in‡ation goal. On
the other hand, the monetary authorities were well aware that their control
over in‡ation was too imprecise to make that type of commitment credible,
especially in a setting where the target is de…ned in terms of the volatile
9headlineCPIinstead of ameasureof core in‡ation. Inaddition, given apoint
target, a short horizon makes monetary policy more active, thus generating
more variability in interest rates, the exchange rate, and output.
However, it is well known that under imperfect credibility, the use of
target ranges encourages the public and …nancial markets to focus on the
upper limit of the band. In addition, it was believed that deviating from a
target range reduces the credibility of the monetary authorities more than
missing a speci…c target. Hence, the problems arising from the credibility of
the in‡ation target in Colombia did not support the move towards a range
for in‡ation targets.
In recent years, however, the credibility of monetary policy in Colombia
has been enhanced by the achievement of an in‡ation path generally below
the announced targets. In addition, one digit in‡ation levels have been
reached and in‡ation will be approaching its steady state level in a few years.
Considering these developments, at the end of 2001 the Board of Directors
of the central bank decided to adopt a 4%-6% range for the in‡ation point
target in 2003. By the end of 2002 the point target for in‡ation will be
set within the announced range. The mid point for the range will be used
operatively for policy decisions. At the same time, a 3% the long term
in‡ation target was also announced.
3.1.4 The speed of disin‡ation and target de…nition
The …rst target of 22% in‡ation for 1992 was followed by a target of 22%
for 1993, 19% for 1994, 18% for 1995, 17% for 1996, 18% for 1997, 16% for
1998, 15% for 1999, 10% for 2000, 8% for 2001 and 6% for 2002. This shows
an gradualism in the pace of disin‡ation. Due to the extensive history of
moderate in‡ation with strong informal indexation mechanisms, it has been
thought thatthereductionofin‡ationshouldbe gradual inorder tomaintain
the society’s support and avoid extremely high disin‡ation costs.
In de…ning the in‡ation target, the Banco de la República’s sta¤ carries
out three types of technical tasks:
¡Detailed assessment of the in‡ationary pressures existing in the short
and medium term.
¡In‡ation projections using econometric models.
¡Financial programming in the International Monetary Fund(IMF) tra-
dition.
The evaluation of in‡ationary pressures is based on an analysis of the
recent evolution of consumer and producer prices; the behavior of di¤erent
core in‡ation indicators; the trends of monetary aggregates and their devi-
ation from their guidelines; the evaluation of economic activity in relation
to di¤erent estimates of potential GDP; the surveys of in‡ationary expec-
tations; the behavior of the nominal exchange rate, among others. This
10evaluation of the in‡ation outlook is complemented with:
¡The in‡ation forecast and balance of risk derived from the MMT. This
assessment includes an evaluationof theimpact of foreseeable supply shocks.
¡In‡ation forecasts coming from monthly auto-regressive models.
¡A in‡ation forecasts produced with a Combination of Structural Sin-
gle Equation Models (CSM) reduced form quarterly econometric models
including among its explanatory variables the stock of money, the nominal
exchange rate, wages and the output gap.
The in‡ationtargetis alsoestablished on the basis ofa…nancial program-
ming exercise a-la-IMF. The estimate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
growth implicit in the national government budget and a preliminary in‡a-
tion target produce an initial estimate of nominal spending growth to be
…nanced with the creation of liquidity. This …gure, together with forecasts
of the capital account of the balance of payments and the external and in-
ternal credit requirements of the Government, enables the assessment of i)
the coherence of …nancial ‡ows among the di¤erent sectors of the economy
and ii) the price, exchange rate and interest rate e¤ects of monetary and
…scal policies implicit in the exercise.
If the results show lack of coherence between monetary and …scal objec-
tives, either spending adjustment alternatives are analyzed or the exercise is
carried out again with di¤erent assumptions about in‡ation, output growth,
and exchange and interest rates. The …nal version of the …nancial program-
ming exercise - completed by the technical sta¤ of the Central Bank and the
Ministry of Finance- and its conclusions are submitted for study and ap-
proval by the Bank’s Board of Directors. The Board then examines all the
information available and decides and announces the quantitative in‡ation
target.
3.2 Monitoring
Monetary variables are monitored continually: The Economic Research and
Monetary Operation Departments produce, once a week, two reports includ-
ing the most recent behavior of monetary andcredit aggregates, newdata on
Treasury transactions, the latest interest rate …gures, the behavior of open
market transactions, and monthly projections of the monetary aggregates,
among others3. These documents are presented at a weekly meeting of the
members of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank, representatives of
the Treasury, the Public Credit o¢ce, and members of the technical sta¤ of
Banco de la República. The nature of any deviation in monetary aggregates
from their ”reference lines” is studied.
Similarly, in tracing progress towards the in‡ation target, since 1993, the
3This section is based in (Uribe et al. , 1999).
11technical sta¤ has produced a comprehensive In‡ation Report every month.
Since the …rst report, the format has undergone a number of changes. In
its current form the In‡ation Report is divided into …ve sections. The …rst
one reviews the latest information on consumer and producer prices. The
second one presents the latest developments in variables that are key in
the determination of in‡ation, including monetary variables, production,
wages and capacity utilization. The third part displays results of the Bank’s
quarterly survey of expectations. The fourth contains a review of recent
developments in the Colombia’s main trading partners, as well as signi…cant
events in international commodity and …nancial markets. The …fth section
lays out in‡ation forecasts for the next 18 months.
Three sections ofthe Quarterly In‡ationReport deserve special mention.
First, themeasures ofunderlying(core)in‡ation. TheBancodela República
has devoted some research e¤ort to applying various statistical methods
form distinguishing between permanent and temporary shocks to the price
level and to the in‡ation rate (Jaramillo et al. 1999 and updates). This
research underlies the use of several alternative indicators of core in‡ation
that have been used in monetary policy discussions for a number of years.
These indicators are evaluated from time to time using di¤erent economic
and statistical criteria.
Second, section three of the Quarterly In‡ation Report presents results
of a survey of expectations that is conducted by the Banco de la República.
The survey is sent to a large sample of private sector …rms (including the
…nancial sector), producers associations and academic centers. The survey
asks respondents about their expectations for in‡ation at the end of the cur-
rent and following year, and movements in exchange rates, interest rates and
production. The survey also includes questions on the perception of current
and future liquidity, and on planned wage, price and investment behavior
of their …rm (or sector). The Banco de la República also uses forward-
looking market estimates of in‡ation, based on the secondary market prices
of indexed and non-indexed government bonds of similar maturity.
Third, the …nal section discusses the general trend in the results from
the Bank’s forecasting models. These include the MMT, auto-regressive
models, a Combination of Structural Single Equation Models (CSM). The
forecasting procedure is presented in more detail below.
With the introduction of the MMT in the preparation of the In‡ation
Report, there are now qualitative and quantitative statements regarding the
e¤orts that will be required to meet the in‡ation target. There is also an
estimate of the lag in thee¤ect of monetary policy onin‡ationanda detailed
discussion of the upward and downward risks to the in‡ation outlook, as
re‡ected by a ”fan chart”. Risk analysis is also undertaken by the means of
analyzing alternative scenarios. There are no forecasts of output or the real
12side of the economy di¤erent from those produced by the MMT as an input
in the production of the in‡ation forecast.
3.3 Transparency and Communication Strategy
The response of …nancial markets to expectations has increased in Colombia
in the last few years4. With the purpose of guiding the market’s expec-
tations, the Banco de la República publishes each year the quantitative
in‡ation target, and the ”reference line” of high powered money. With a
lag of two weeks, the Central Bank makes weekly results of monetary ag-
gregates and international reserves available to the general public. On the
other hand, on a daily basis agents have information on the exchange rate.
Every month, after analyzing the behavior of prices, the Board of Direc-
tors, or any of its members, delivers a statement about the new …gure for
in‡ation. As stated above, since December 1998 a quarterly In‡ation Re-
port, similar to those elaborated by several central banks that have adopted
In‡ationTargeting as their monetary strategy, has beenpublished. The pub-
lished Report includes the Banco de la República’s in‡ation forecast and it
is accompanied by a statement where the Board of Directors explains any
monetary policy decisions made after studying the Report and after exam-
ining the behavior of the monetary base with respect to its ”reference line”.
No announcements on future policy are made. In particular, the Bank does
not publish the future path of policy rates that it considers to be compat-
ible with the achievement of the in‡ation target. The publication of the
future expected path of interest rates used in the construction of the in‡a-
tion forecast could be an interesting possibility since, as shown in Tarkka
and Mayes (1999), it could reduce output variability by revealing the central
bank’s estimate of the private sector’s expectations. It could also help ex-
plain the rationale ofthe in‡ation forecast and the policy actions. To convey
the Bank’s forecasting uncertainty, ”fan charts” for in‡ation and output are
published, based on the central view, level of uncertainty and balance of
risks of the MMT. The MMT as well as the forecast of other models, mainly
the CSM are documented below.
Twice a year the Board presents to Congress a report that evaluates the
recent evolution of economic policy and the economy. At times, members
of the Board participate in academic events and present their personal view
regarding the economy’s behavior and perspectives.
The measuresadopted by theBoardofDirectors are made public through
resolutions, reports and press conferences. The modi…cations in the Central
Bank’s intervention interest rates in themoney market are informed through
press reports and thenet results ofthe OMO are published weekly. The Cen-
4This section is based on Uribe et al., 1999, and Tarka and Mayes, 1999).
13tral Bank’s intervention in the exchange rate market is based on announced
rules. Thus, the size of the intervention is announced to the public immedi-
ately after it takes place.
3.4 Policy Instruments
The main policy instrument of Banco de la República is the interest rate
on its repo and reverse-repo operations. The Bank supplies and withdraws
liquidity to the …nancial system through 1-15 day repo and reverse-repo
operations. These operations are conducted by means of auctions. The
Boardof Directors set the minimumandmaximum interest rates forthe repo
and reverse-repo auctions, respectively, while the amounts of the operations
to be auctioned are de…ned monthly, based on the estimates of the demand
for monetary base (approximated by its ”reference line”) and projections
of the supply of base money constructed with expected purchases/sales of
international reserves, purchases/sales of government bonds, lender of last
resort operations and the monetary e¤ect of Banco de la República’s pro…ts
and losses. At the same time, Banco de la República provides (withdraws)
liquidity from the …nancial system in unlimited amounts at ”punitive” or
”Lombard” interest rates.
Thus, there is a range for the policy rates whose lowest end is the ”Lom-
bard” contraction rate and the upper end is the ”Lombard” expansion rate.
The minimum rate for the repo auction is below the ”Lombard” expansion
rate, but is higher than the maximum rate for the reverse-repo auction, the
latter, in turn, exceeds the contraction ”Lombard” rate. The ”Lombard”
rates establish a range where the interbank rate can ‡uctuate, although
such a range may be narrower when the amounts of repo and reverse-repo
auctions are large enough to supply (absorb) all liquidity at those rates.
There has been a gradual narrowing of the policy rates range in the past
three years. In December, 1999, the distance between the ”Lombard” rates
was 1200 basis points, while the di¤erence between the minimum and maxi-
mum auction rates was 600 basis points. In September, 2001 these distance
has been reduced to 650 and 100 basis points, respectively. Such narrowing
of the policy rate range has been possible as the monetary policy strategy
has become clearer and has contributed to strengthening the link between
the policy rates, the interbank rate andlongerterm rates. This transmission,
however, continues to be a¤ected by events in the external sector, namely,
the behavior of the external interest rates, and the country and depreciation
risk premium. For example, when there is a clear trend toward a fall of the
risk premium, the markets may consider that a reduction of the domestic
short term rates by Banco de la República may be sustainable, this allows a
faster transmission of the shift in the policy stance to the longer term rates.
14Beside the repo and reverse-repo operations, Banco de la República pro-
vides (mops up) liquidity through purchases (sales) of international reserves,
according to the announced rules for intervention in the foreign exchange
market, and purchases (sales) of government bonds. These operations are
considered to a¤ect the ”permanent” supply of monetary base and usually
performed by the end of the year, when most of the growth of the demand
for monetary base takes place.
4 The In‡ation Forecasting System of the Banco de la
República
The In‡ation Forecasting System of the Banco de la República (Figure 2)
consists of the following models:
1. ”Modelo de Mecanismos de Transmisión ” (MMT), used for forecast-
ing and policy analysis.
2. Combination of Structural (single equation) Models (CSM).
5. A model of food in‡ation by type of product,
3. A neoclassical growth model, used for forecasting potential output
and also for analysis.
6. A supply side output forecasting system (OFS).
4. A set of auto-regressive models.
At the beginning of every month the forecasting procedure begins when
the statistics department (DANE) releases the last …gure for in‡ation. In
the …rst forecasting round the MMT, the neoclassical growth model, the
auto-regressive models, and the food in‡ation model are run. The results of
these models are evaluated and used as input to the CSM and to the OFS.
In the second forecasting round, the output of these last two sets of models
combined with the output of the food in‡ation model is used to feed the
adjustments and the asymmetry of the in‡ation and output fan charts. In
preparing the In‡ation Report the sta¤ spends seven days from the day CPI
data is released to the day the report is presented to the board.
Projections for output, in‡ation, and interest rates from the MMT are
also used as input for an estimation of the demand of monetary base. Given
the di¢culty in estimating a demand for money, at times the reference line
for the monetary base has in e¤ect been abandoned as the nominal an-
chor. As progress in the development of the In‡ation Forecasting System is




of Structural Inflation forecast
Models (CSM)














sive models  of inflation
Core inflation
Inflation
100% off mo- Food inflation
del judgment Output growth
Output fore- Forecast of 
casting sys- output growth
tem (OFS)
Assumptions 
some right hand side variables
Nonfood inflation
FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN MODELS
Adjustments food inflation, 
asymetry of Fan Chart
Potential output
Projections of core inflation inform
Jugment on output growth
Assumptions 
some right hand side variables
judgement on degree of backward
lookingness of the Phillips curve.
Adjustments to short run inflation
Figure 2: The In‡ation Forecasting System of the Banco de la República
165 The Model of Transmission Mechanisms
The MMT5 is used for policy analysis and also for forecasting; since Sep-
tember 2001 it constitutes the sta¤s’s o¢cial forecasts and feeds the central
view of the in‡ation report’s fan chart.
5.1 Characteristics
Theprice-wagesystemisstatically homogeneous, dynamically homogeneous,
and forward looking. In the wage price system the nominal-real trade o¤ is
nonlinear.
The policy rule is in‡ation forecast based.
In the model currently the measure of potential output is exogenous, it
is based on the production approach to potential output and comes from
the neoclassical growth model (also presented in this document).
The nominal exchange rate is determined in policy simulations by UIP,
and when forecasting it is assumed exogenous.
There are supply shocks in the agricultural sector, a cobweb-like dynam-
ics of the relative price of food is switched on by droughts. Core in‡ation is
neutral to supply shocks.
5.2 Equations in the model
The following equations are estimated:
Phillips curve
Aggregate demand
Transmission between interest rates
Imported price in‡ation
Long run of prices, wages and the price of imports




There are also about 10 de…nitions and liking equations.
In‡ation in Colombia is determined mainly by the extent of slack in eco-
nomic activity (the output gap) andsupply shocks in the agricultural sector.
These are the two main characteristics of the Colombian economy the MMT
incorporates. The model can stand alone without food in‡ation, in this case
it produces a forecast for core in‡ation (measured as nonfood in‡ation). A
separate block for food in‡ation habilitates the model to forecast the overall
5The current version of the model was originated in Gómez and Julio (2000), and
draws from Gómez (2000) on wage indexation, Avella (2001) on the supply shocks in
agriculture, and other research that have tackled on other issues.
17CPI. There are two reasons for modelling the food sector separately. On
the one hand, as we explain below, there is not much monetary policy can
do to o¤set the kind of supply shocks that occur in Colombia. The reason
is that they appear suddenly, are di¢cult to predict, and change in‡ation
in the very short run. On the other hand, the board of the bank may not
move interest rates in response to supply shocks since this policy would add
variability to the real economy. Although the in‡ation target is de…ned in
the overall CPI, if a supply shock results in the central bank not meeting the
target, the board would explain that that happened as a result of a supply
shock, that the event is transitory and that core in‡ation is in line with the
target6.
In the MMT monetary policy is neutral and superneutral in the long
run, but has important e¤ects on the economy in the short run.
5.3 The Transmission Channels
The aggregate demand channel: Assume an exogenous intervention de-
creases the realinterest ratebelowthe longrunequilibrium(Figure 3, Region
A). By the aggregate demand equation the relatively low level of the real
interest rate increases output above potential (Region B). By the Phillips
curve, the negative output gap increases in‡ation above target (Region C).
By the policy rule, the deviation of in‡ation from target increases the real
interest rate above the long-run equilibrium. The interest rate is kept above
the long-run equilibrium until in‡ation converges to target. At this point
output is equal to potential and the output gap is zero.
Direct exchange rate channel: an increase in interest rates leads to
an immediate appreciation. The appreciation causes a decrease in in‡ation
with a one-quarter lag. The e¤ect of the direct exchange rate channel on
in‡ation is small.
Indirect exchange rate channel: an increase in the interest rate leads
to an immediate appreciation. The appreciation causes a decrease in output
with a lag of one quarter. The decrease in output leads with a lag one
quarter lag to a small decrease in in‡ation.
Expectations channel: a decrease in in‡ation expectations for the
next quarter leads to a decrease in current in‡ation. The e¤ect on in‡ation
depends on the weight of in‡ation expectations in the Phillips curve.
Cost push channel: in the long run prices tend to costs and nominal
wages tend to the value of average output.
6This was the explanation given by the Board in the July 1988 Report to Congress.
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Figure 3: Flow chart of the ”Modelos de Mecanismos de Transmisión”
(MMT)
195.4 The Shocks
5.4.1 Supply shocks, droughts, and food in‡ation
In 1991 the weather phenomenon El Niño drove food price in‡ation up be-
yond 30%. The post Niño weather brought good harvests and with it tem-
porarily lowfood-price in‡ation: 10% in1993. The cyclerepeated itself later
with food-price in‡ation of 25% in 1998 followed by 2.5% in 1999. As food
items are 30% of the CPI, weather changes may continue to be an important
source of short-term shocks to in‡ation.
Figure 4 shows the impact of droughts on food in‡ation. Panel 1 shows
the amount of rainfall measured in cubic millimeter. Panel 2 the seasonal
pattern of the amount of rainfall; depicted in logs. The amount of rainfall
may double from the …rst quarter of the year two the second one. Panel
3 shows the seasonally adjusted amount of rainfall. The amount of rainfall
may not a¤ect agricultural output when it rains well above the average but
its does when it is below a critical level. Following Avella (2000), we have
de…ned this critical level as ¡20%. Any amount of rainfall below this critical
level is our de…nition of drought. Panels 5 and 6 show CPI in‡ation, food
in‡ation and nonfood in‡ation. The behavior of food in‡ation shows the
cobweb like pro…le triggered by a shift to the left in the supply of food
products on the relative price of food. The cobweb e¤ect is illustrated in
Figure 5.
5.4.2 Shift in in‡ation targets
Simulating the e¤ects of a permanent decrease in the in‡ation target would
help us quantify the e¤ect of the macroeconomic program agreed with the
IMF that set an in‡ation target path of 10%, 8%, and 6% for 2000, 2001 and
2002 respectively (Figure 6). Although these targets were not compulsory,
they were part of the overall macroeconomic programme and as such acted
as the monetary policy anchor.
Beyond 2002, in‡ation targets are also decreasing to a long run target
of 3%. This …gure, announced in 22 November 2001, was believed to be
small enough for in‡ation not to be a problem, but big enough to enable the
Banco de la República to eventually undertake an expansionary monetary
policy, ease changes in relative prices, and incorporate possible biases in the
measurement of the CPI. The long run in‡ation target was de…ned on the
overall CPI.
The long run in‡ation target appears in Figure 6. The …gure also shows
the 4%¡6% range for the point target for the endof 2003. The range for the
target for the end of 2003 was decided at the end of 2001 and the decision























































































“The Cobweb effect”: Starting from equilibrium at (Q0,P0) a supply 
shock moves the supply schedule from SS to SS´.  Excess demand is 
generated at P 0, and prices rise.  Excess supply is generated, and 
prices fall back again. This “cobweb effect” continues until new 
equilibrium is reached at (Q1,P1).  
Figure 5: Supply shocks in agriculture
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Figure 6: Gradual decrease in in‡ation targets








Figure 7: Shocks to the terms of trade
5.4.3 Terms of trade
Since co¤ee and oil and derivatives amounts to 11.4% and 32.5% of exports
in 2001 respectively, the ‡uctuations in the international market price is an
important source of variability to the Colombian economy. Movements in
the terms of trade are quantitatively large, in the logarithmic scale in Figure
7, a change of 0.1 means a 10% change.
5.4.4 Risk premium
The foreign exchange risk premium has also been, on occasion, an impor-
tant source of uncertainty for Colombia. The risk premiumcan be swayedby
domestic economic factors, such as the evolution of public …nances and de-
velopments in the con‡ict with guerrilla groups, or external developments,
such as international …nancial crises. Since the risk premium a¤ects the
exchange rate, it may have important consequences for in‡ation (Figure 8).
5.4.5 Changes in interest rates
At times the interest rate itself may become a source of exogenous variability
to the economy (Figure 9). Below we also model the e¤ect of a temporary
monetary policy impulse. This shock can also help us discuss the e¤ects of
both temporary and permanent shifts in the monetary stance.









Figure 8: Spread of Colombian bonds










Figure 9: Real interest rates
255.5 The Phillips Curve
5.5.1 Estimation







































Standard error of estimate 0.0067.
The Ljung-Box Q test does not show any evidence of autocorrelation up
to order 32.
Jarque Bera statistic p-value: 0.349.
As the coe¢cient on z¼
t¡1 in Eq. (??) is not signi…cant, it was calibrated
to ¡0:005.




t¡4; yt; and the gap in capacity untilization, gaps zero
to four.
The coe¢cient on in‡ationexpectations, althoughestimated in 0.329 was




t ¡ logP C
t¡4; PC
t is core in‡ation where PC
t is the monthly geo-
metric average of the nonfood component of the CPI.
yt is the output gap.
¼M
t = PM
t ¡ P M
t¡4; is in‡ation of the price of imports, where PM
t is the
imported component of the PPI.
zP
t = PC
t ¡ c1 ¡ Ut is the long run of the Phillips curve.
Ut = Wt + Nt ¡ Yt is the log of the unit labor cost.
Wt the log of the nominal wage.




t is a dumy for 1997:1-2001:4. Unknown.
d2
5 is adummy for 1992:3-1993:3. Market reforms in foreing trade sector.
d3
t is a dumy for 1986:2-1986:3. IMF adjustment program.
265.5.3 Results
The Phillips curve is expectational, superneutral, neutral, and nonlinear.
It is expectational in the sense that it includes in‡ation expectations,
approximated with observed future in‡ation. The forward looking part of
the Phillips curve weights about 15.0% of the weight of all the coe¢cients on
the nominal variables. The high weight of the backward looking component
implies that decreasing in‡ation is costly. Chadha, Masson, and Meredith
(1992) illustrate that the cost of disin‡ation is decreasing in the coe¢cient
of future in‡ation and that it approaches zero when the coe¢cient on future
in‡ation is one half.
The Phillips curve is superneutral because the sum of the coe¢cients on
in‡ation in the Phillips curve is one. This property is also known as dynamic
homogeneity and makes the long-run trade o¤ between output and in‡ation
disappear, that is, in the long run the Phillips curve is vertical. There is
a trade o¤ between economic activity and in‡ation but this trade o¤ takes
place in the short run. Any attempt to stimulate output is not lasting in the
long run; it only results in higher in‡ation. Due to the property of dynamic
homogeneity, in the absence of shocks, in‡ation tends to perpetuate at a
given level unless it is obliged to change by an output gap that is di¤erent
from zero, a supply shock, or a movement in the exchange rate. Colombian
in‡ation increased to a higher average by 1973 after twenty …ve years it
could probably settle at a lower level. The history of some Latin-American
countries is a real example of how monetary policy in the long run can not
stimulate economic activity.
The Phillips curve is neutral becauseit includes a log runerror correction
adjustment. Static homogeneity makes the model neutral in the price level,
this means that the economy converges to the same solution of the real
variables whenever there is a change in the price level.
It is nonlinear because in‡ation is a nonlinear function of the output gap.
Nonlinearity in the Phillips curve has interesting policy implications: The
higher the recession, the higher the number of percentage points of output
that must be foregone to decrease in‡ation by one percent and the higher
the cost of disin‡ation. An increase in in‡ation implies a gain in output
that is smaller than the cost of returning in‡ation back to the initial level.
A gradual disin‡ation over a long period of time has a cost that is smaller
than the cost of a sudden disin‡ation7.
Nonlinearity has been introduced to the Phillips curve in a number of
ways8. In this model we make thePhillipscurvenonlinearby lettingin‡ation
7See Clark and Laxton (1997), Isard, Laxton and Eliasson (1999), Isard and Laxton
(1996), Laxton, Rose and Tambakis (1998), Laxton, Rose and Tetlow (1993), Phillips
(1998) for the policy implications of convexity of the Phillips curve.
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Figure 10: The Nonlinear E¤ect of the Output Gap on In‡ation
depend on a nonlinear function of the output gap9:








where ¾ = 0 for linearity and ¾ < 0 for convexity. The model is hence
operational with linearity and with di¤erent degrees of convexity. In the
simulations we use ¾ = ¡16:227 a parameter that was estimated by NLLS.
Figure 10 shows the e¤ect on in‡ation (minus in‡ation expectations) of
di¤erent levels of the output gap1011.
5.6 Nominal Wages
Nominal wages are determined according to an overlapping contracts model
(Taylor, 1980, 1993). We have assumed all wage contracts last four quarters
and staggering is uniform:
Xt = ¸0Vt + ¸1Vt+1jt + ¸2Vt+2jt +¸3Vt+3jt +0:05F(yt¡1) + 0:02zW
t¡4 + c2
linearities in the Phillips curve.
9The absence of asymptotes in this function is a considerable simpli…cation.
10The degree of convexity in both …gures is ¾ = 16:227: The axes in both functions have
been multiplied by 100. As the model is nonlinear, in the program, a 10% disin‡ation
should be understood as a decrease in in‡ation of ¡0:1.
11We tried to include the domestric price of oil in the Phillips curve measured as the
change in the domestic price of oil relative to the change in the CPI, but the results where
not statisticaly signi…cant.
28Wt = ¸0Xt + ¸1Xt¡1 + ¸2Xt¡2 +¸3Xt¡3) (2)
Due to the quality of wage data, we have preferred a calibration.
5.6.1 De…nitions
Xt is the log of the contract wage.
Vt = P C
t +Yt ¡ Lt is the log of the value of average output.
yt is the output gap.
zW

























Estimation method: restricted least squares.
Sample: 1990:1 2000:4
R2 = 0:935
Standard error of Estimate 0.019





t¡4 is food in‡ation, where P F
t is the log of the price of food.
et is the log of the amount of rain.
²t seasonally adjusted deviation of the amount of rainfall from the long
run average.
't is the measure of droughts.
zF
t = PF
t ¡ c4 ¡P C
t is the long run of the price of food.
c4 = 0:150:
295.7.3 Results and Estimation Issues
Droughts are measured as the seasonally adjusted amount of rain that is
20% below the average. Algebraically,
't = ²t + 0:2 if ²t < ¡0:2 and
't = 0 if ²t > ¡0:2
where
²t = et ¡ (c+ ±1d1t +±2d2t + ±3d3t)
According to Avella (2001), the rainfall variable enters with a negative
sign at short lags because of the e¤ect of the weather on food supply and
with a positive sign by the …fth quarter because, as in the cobweb e¤ect,
farmers respond to high relative prices with an increase in supply.
Food in‡ation is quite volatile. This can be seen in the high standard
error of the food in‡ation equation. The MMT projection of food in‡ation
is always complemented with input from a model of food in‡ation by type
of product and also with judgment by experts in agriculture.
5.8 CPI in‡ation
CPI in‡ation is a convex combination of core in‡ation and food in‡ation:




























Estimation method: Restricted LS.
Sample period: 1990:1 2001:1.
Standard error of estimate 0.014.
R2 = 0:804:
P-value Lung Box Q: 0:576.
5.9.1 De…nitions
yt is the output gap.
rt = it ¡ ¼C
t is the real interest rate.
it is the 90 days Certi…cates of Term Deposits (CDT).
zUSA
t is the US output gap estimated with the HP …lter.
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The aggregate demand equation is one of the most important equations
in the model because di¤erent calibrations of its parameters within their
con…dence intervals signi…cantly change the shape of the impulse response
functions. We have estimated the equation since 1980 in order to obtain a
degree of output gap persistence that is consistent with business cycles that
last for about 8 years and also consistent with the current small recovery of
output growth.
It is important to note that the real interest rate is de…ned on core in‡a-
tion, otherwise supply shocks would have second round e¤ects on economic
activity through the de…nition of the real interest rate. This may be consid-
ered as a simpli…cation that is indirectly considering the fact that aggregate
demand should depend on a long run interest rate.
5.10 The Policy Rule
The policy rule is:
it = Áit¡1 +(1 ¡ Á)(
_
rt + ¼C




it is the nominal interest rate on 90 days certi…cates of deposits (CDT).
_
rt is the long run real interest rate.
¼C
t is core in‡ation.
¼¤
t is the in‡ation target.
¼C
t+kjt is the forecast of core in‡ation k periods ahead conditional upon
information up to time t.
Á is a smoothing parameter.
c5 = 0:02 is the di¤erence in the long run between the policy rate and
the deposit rate.
5.10.2 Some results
The targeting horizon k is 8 quarters. With the aim of increasing the con-
trol of in‡ation and the credibility of the central bank while in‡ation is
decreasing, an attempt was undertaken to decrease the targeting horizon
to 4 quarters. As shown by Svensson (2001), and Rudebusch and Svens-
son (1998), a relatively short policy horizon increases the volatility of GDP
31and other real variables. It also demands a more active policy and higher
volatility of the policy rate.
As a policy prescription, a volatile path of the policy rate demands a
deep study of the assumptions underlying the recommendation and thor-
ough knowledge of the sensitivity of the policy prescription to di¤erent as-
sumptions about the output gap, the long run interest rate and also other
sources of uncertainty. We then decided to maintain the targeting horizon
in eight quarters.
A study was developed on what type of measures of in‡ation should
enter Eq. (6) (Banco de la República 2001a, 2001b). The conclusion of
these studies is that ¼C
t should enter the second and third terms of Eq. (6).
The reason is explained below in the analysis of the impulse response to a
supply shock.
5.11 The Transmission Between Interest Rates
5.11.1 Estimation
















Estimation method: Restricted LS.
Sample: 1992:1 2001:2, quarterly.
R2 = 0:926:
Standard Error of Estimate 0.0229.
Signi…cance of Lung Box Q: 0.206.
5.11.2 De…nitions
it is the 90 days interest rate on certi…cates of term deposits (CDT Bancos
y Corporaciones).
iP
t is the policy rate, the inter bank interest rate (TIB) at an annual rate.
¢ is the fourth di¤erence operator.
5.11.3 Estimation Issues
The estimation was subject tothe restrictionthat the coe¢cients onit¡4 and
iP
t¡4 were equal to each other with di¤erent sign. This restriction passedwith
a Â2
(1;30) = 0:335; p-value 0.567. With the restriction imposed the coe¢cients
on the …rst di¤erences of the variables add up to one. The coe¢cients on
¢it¡1; ¢iP
t and ¢iP
t¡4 were hence calibrated to 0.25, 0.5 and 0.2512.
12The estimates of this equation could change in the event the central bank changes its
policies about the communication of the future path of interest rates or if the in‡ation
32Deposit Deposit
Quarter Rate Quarter Rate
0 0.500
1 0.875 7 1.009
2 0.969 8 1.107
3 0.992 9 1.042
4 1.146 10 1.012
5 1.073 11 1.002
6 1.028 12 1.074
Table 1: Response of the Deposit Rate to a One Percentage Point Increase
in the Interbank Rate
5.11.4 Results
Table 1 shows the response of the deposit rate to a one percentage point
increase in the interbank rate. On impact the deposit rate increases to half
the increase in the interbank rate. In one quarter the deposit rate increases
to 87.5% of the change in the interbank rate. The complete long run change
of one percent in the deposit rate is achieved almost completely two quarters
after the shock13.
5.12 Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
The nominal exchange rate vis a vis the US is determined by the uncovered
interest parity condition (UIP):
Et = Et+1jt ¡ 0:25(it ¡ i
US
t ¡ 't) (8)
EUS
t is the nominal exchange rate vis a vis the US.
it is the 90 days deposit interest rate.
iUS
t is the US 90 days interest rate on certi…cates of deposit.
't is the country risk premium.
5.13 The Pass-Through





t +0:150et ¡ 0:001z
M
t¡4 (9)
targeting strategy is better undertood by the public.
13The oscilations of the impulse response function after the third quarter are a result
of using four quarter di¤erences. They do not arise when forecasting with real data.












Figure 11: Cost push channel
where
¼M




t is the long run of the price of imports where P M
t is
the imported goods component of the PPI.
et = Et ¡ Et¡4 is the rate of exchange rate depreciation, where Et is the
nominal exchange rate.
c3 = ¡1:800.
5.14 The Long Run
In the long run prices converge to costs, nominal wages to the value of
average output and the price of imports to the domestic price level. As
explained above, a well de…ned long run makes the model neutral, that is,
the long run solution of the real variables is independent of the price level.
In the Phillips curve, positive values of the cointegrating error arise when
costs have risen above prices; as they enter the Phillips curve with negative
sign, they represent in‡ationary pressure. Figure ?? shows the growth of
total costs estimated as a weighted average of unit labor costs and the price
of imports. The estimated weights are 0.8 for the unit labor cost and 0.2 for
the price of imports.
345.14.1 The long run of the wage equation
In the long run nominal wages should converge to the value of average out-
put:
Wt = c2 +Vt +z
W
t (10)
where Vt = P C
t +Yt ¡ Nt is the log of the value of average output.
c2 = ¡7:677.
The long run of the nominal wage equation is de…ned as
zW
t = Wt ¡ c2 ¡ Vt (11)
5.14.2 The long run of the price of imports
In the long run the price of imports converges to the domestic price level:
PM









t ¡ c3+ P
C
t (13)
5.14.3 The long run of the Phillips curve














t ¡ c1 ¡ Ut ¡ P
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Ut = Wt + Nt ¡ Yt is unit labor cost
Wt is the log of nominal wages14
Nt is the log of the labor force
Yt is the log of output
PC
t is the log of the nonfood component of the CPI.
c1 = 6:971 is a constant.
14We use wage …gures processed by DNP on raw data from the Encuesta Anual Manu-
factureraproduced by DANE.This series is available until 2000Q2, hence we have updated
it with data for wages in the industrial sector.
355.14.4 Cointegration analysis
The variables prices and price of imports in Eq. (12) are cointegrated. The
null of a long run relationship betweenthem one to one as in Eq. (12) passes
with a p-value of 0.87.
The variables nominal wages and the value of average output product in
are also cointegrated. The null hipothesis of a one to one relationship as in
Eq. (10) is not rejected with a p-value of 0.99.
The variables prices, unit labor cost and price of imports in Eq. (14) are
cointegrated. The coe¢cient ® = 0:112 was obtained with ordinary least
squares in levels.
5.15 Calibration and Adjustments
The calibration includes a Phillips curvethat may be more backwardlooking
than the estimated one. As the weights of future and past in‡ation in the
Phillips curve are di¢cult to estimate, they may be calibrated so that the
future evolution of nonfood in‡ation is in line with judgement and with
auto-regressive projections of di¤erent measures of core in‡ation.
Adjustments in the MMT mainly have to do with the price of food.
Judgements for these adjustments come from a satellite model for food in-
‡ation by type of product and from judgement from …eld experts.
As an example, in January 2002 the adjustments were: a +0.1 adjust-
ment during 2002Q1-2002Q4 and a ¡0.1 adjustment during 2003Q1-2003Q4
to the equation for food in‡ation ¼F
t to account for livestock cycle.
A 0.1 value for the drought in 2001Q1 instead of the ¡0.19 observed
because, although that drought did a¤ect crops, it did not seem to a¤ect
potato crops.
A ¡0.1 expected drought in 2003Q1. The expected value was obtained
as a one third probability of a drought comparable in size to one of the
biggest during the nineties.
The exogenous forecast for the nominal exchange rate was given by a
projection of the balance of payments.
5.16 Response to the main shocks
5.16.1 A Supply Shock in the Agricultural Sector
Disturbances to relative food prices make in‡ation volatile (upper pales of
Figure 12). Food items are a small share of GDP but a fairly large share of
the CPI. In the model, monetary policy does not respond to these kind of
supply shock disturbances. The experiment consists of a ¡0.35 drought like
the one observed in 1998Q1. The impact of the drought on food in‡ation
is an increase of 5% two quarters after the shock and a decrease of 8% six
36quarters after the shock. In these same quarters CPI in‡ation increases
relative to the baseline by 1.5% and then decreases by ¡2.2%. The e¤ect
of the drought is an increase in food in‡ation and CPI in‡ation while core
in‡ation, real interest rates and output are left unchanged.
The model has been designed neutral to supply shocks in agriculture
because when there is one of these shocks, there is not much a central bank
can do.
The dotted lines in Figure 12 show an economy where the central bank
does not respond to supply shocks. The only e¤ect of the shock is on CPI
and food in‡ation. The solid lines depict the path of the economy when the




rt + ¼t ¡ c5) + 0:75(¼t+4jt ¡ ¼¤
t+k) (17)
This rule has a quick response to the overall CPI.
The central bank intends to o¤set the expected decrease in CPI in‡ation
four quarters ahead by decreasing the real interest rate and increasing core
in‡ation. Extra variance is added to the output gap. Despite the strong
feedback of the central bank to supply shocks, CPI in‡ation four or eight
quarters ahead is unaltered.
5.16.2 A Permanent Shift in the In‡ation Target
As soon as the in‡ation target is decreased, nominal interest rates are raised
permanently. The increase in interest rates leads immediately to a faster
nominal exchange rate appreciation. That appreciation passes very quickly,
although not immediately, to lower the rate of in‡ation in the price of im-
ports. Acting through the exchange rate channel, one quarter after the
shock, in‡ation decreases. This e¤ect of the direct exchange rate channel on
in‡ation is, however, small.
Not only nominal but also real interest rates increase on impact. The
real rate remains positive for tenquarters. This creates arecession that lasts
for several years reaching a trough in the eighth quarter. From the fourth
quarter onwards, the aggregate demand channel kicks in to accelerate the
disin‡ation process. In‡ation decreases 75 basis points by 14 quarters and
95 basis points by 19 quarters (Figure 13).
The sacri…ce ratio, or the cumulative loss of output per unit of annual
in‡ation reduced, is in this version of the model 0.788. The shock to the
target seems to be a good method to quantify the sacri…ce ratio, since the
e¤ect of output on in‡ation is cleaned for the e¤ect on in‡tion of other
tranmission channels.
37Food inflation
















































































Figure 12: A supply shock with and without feedbak in monetary policy





































Figure 13: A permanent shift in the in‡ation target
395.16.3 A Shock to the Price Level Target
This shock is designed for a purpose that is theoretical. To show that in the
long run monetary policy has only nominal e¤ects and does not have any
e¤ect on the real economy. The interest rate rule (6) is replaced with a rule
that pursues a target for the price level:









The target for the price level is changed one percentage point. The
path of the nominal variables, prices, wages, nominal exchange rate, price of
imports also decrease one percentage point in the long run. Real variables
like the output gap and real wages converge in the long run to zero, that
is, converge to the long run equilibrium. The behovior of real and nominal
variables in this shock demonstrates that in the long run monetary policy
does not have any e¤ect on real variables; the model is neutral15.
5.16.4 The E¤ect of Monetary Policy
Figure 15 presents the behavior of the economy under a percentage point
shock to the nominal interest rate that is sustained for four quarters. During
the period of the shock, the policy rate is …xed, but after the fourth quarter
it is allowed to follow the policy rule (Eq. 6). The increase in the policy rate
changes the deposit rate quite quickly (Table 1). Acting through the direct
exchange rate channel, in‡ation decreases immediately and by a relatively
small amount. After a lag, in‡ation falls further following an opening of the
output gap. Once the policy rule is switched on, the interest rate decreases
and this returns in‡ation back to target.
5.16.5 A Shock to the Risk Premium
As investors demand a higher return on Colombian assets, the nominal and
real exchange rates depreciate on impact. Real exchange rate depreciation
leads directly to in‡ation. Interest rates are raised to combat future in‡a-
tionary pressures, rather than to defend an exchange rate. Although trade
improves on impact, eventually the higher real interest rates cause a real
exchange rate appreciation and a recession. Both outcomes act to move
in‡ation back to target (Figure 16).
15Needless tosay, the model does not operate with a price level target but, by mimicking
























































































Figure 15: A transitory shock to the policy rate








































Figure 16: A shock to the country risk premium
43MODEL FORECAST
Phillips curve Inflation
P Star Model Inflation




Smooth Transition Regresion Inflation
ARIMA CPI Inflation
Figure 17: Combination of Forecasts
6 The Combination of Structural Models (CSM)
Figure 17 describes the single equation structural models used in forecasting
in‡ation. Considered in isolation, each of these models focuses on a few
among the many elements that may impact on in‡ation. In order to have an
idea of the combined e¤ect of all these in‡ationary sources the Banco de la
República produces a combination of forecasts (Melo and Castaño (1998)).
The combination of forecasts uses the forecasts of each of these structural
models and may also include the forecast of other auto-regressive models.
The combination of forecasts is a statistical methodology that weights the
forecast of each model to produce a single forecast. The weights depend on
the quality of every model’s forecast.
The models used in the combination of forecasts may enter of leave the
combination depending on the results of statistical tests and the quality of
their forecasts.
446.1 The Phillips Curve Model
This model, developed for Colombia by López and Misas (1998) is based on
the triangular Phillips curve model. It is an augmented Phillips curve since
it incorporates in‡ation expectations. The estimation of this model incor-
porates a variable that measures the probability of change in the in‡ation




























¼t is the …rst di¤erence of the log of the end of period CPI.
yt is the output gap estimated by the production approach to potential
output.
¼M
t is the …rst di¤erence of the logarithm of the PPI for imports.
P1t is the probability of being in a state of high in‡ation according to
Hamilton’s switching model.
D1t a pulse dummy for 1986Q2.
dit seasonal dummies.
6.2 P¤ Model
The seminal paper on the P star model was proposed by Hallman et. al.
This model is based on the quantity theory of money. The Banco de la
República currently runs two versions of this model: the original one and
a modi…ed version (Misas, López and Melo (1999)). The original version
assumes that velocity is stationary. In this case the price level depends on
the velocity gap (M1 velocity) and the output gap (measured with the HP
…lter). However, as the stationarity tests are not conclusive16, a modi…ed
version of the P star model was constructed. This version assumes that
velocity is integrated of order one. The modi…ed version includes a long run
for the demand for money, that is, a cointegrating error for money demand
16The study included stationarity tests for velocity measured with di¤erent monetary
aggregates: monetary base, M1, M3.
45and its determinants. In the modi…ed case the price level is determined by
the output gap (measured by the gap of the industrial production index)





























mt is the deviation of M1 from HP …lter.
D2t pulse dummy for 1985Q1-1985Q2.
D9t pulse dummy for 1986Q4.
6.3 The Relative Price of Food Model
In‡ation in Colombia is mainly determined by the output gap and supply
shocks in the agricultural sector. These two are the main two elements that
this model intends to capture. The projection of the relative price of food
is exogenous to this model and it is constructed with another model that
projects the overall price of food with the projection of a separate model for
each type of product. The model is complemented in the right hand side





































t is the …rst logarithmic di¤erence of the price of food relative to the CPI.
M1
t …rst di¤erence of the logarithm of M1.
D3t pulse dummy for 1999Q1-1999Q2.
6.3.3 Estimation Issues
The estimation was restricted to homogeneity in the lags of in‡ation. The
F-statistic of the homogeneity restriction is F = 2.698, p¡value 0.105.
6.4 The Escandinavian Model
This model follows the Escandinavian tradition17 where in‡ation in a small
open economy is determined by cost push elements as the growth of wages
























Ât …rst di¤erence of the logarithm of the real exchange rate.
!t is the quarterly growth of wages in the industrial sector.
6.4.2 Estimation Issues
The homogeneity restriction has a statistic F = 2.540, p-value = 0.115.
7 The Neoclassical Growth Model
This model produces a path for potential output thatis used as an exogenous
input in the MMT.








17Aee for instance Corbo (1985) and Corbo and Fischer (1995).
47Yt is real output in 1994 pesos.
At is the technology factor, an index number.
Kt is the stock of capital in 1994 pesos.
Nt is the labor force in number of people employed, source DNP.
The stock of capital was built with Harberger’s inventory method:
Kt+1 = (1¡ ±)Kt + It (24)
K1950 = 2:5Y1950 (25)
where
It is gross investment (public, private, and change in inventories18) in
1994 pesos.
± is the rate of depreciation.
The production function (23) may be written
Yt = ®0+ ®tt+ ®Kt + (1¡ ®)Nt + "Y
t
where Yt; Kt; and Nt are the logs of output, the capital stock and the labor
force, and
At = ®0+ ®tt+ "
Y
t (26)
is the technology factor.
7.1 Measuring technology and the productivity slowdown







The technology index and the rate of technological change appear in
Figure 18. In Colombia the productivity slowdown may have started by
1975. The nineties are characterizedby a higher rate of technological change
possibly explained by the openingof the economy and the use ofinformation
technology. The negative technological shock of the late nineties is most
probably explained by the international recession and by thekindof political
developments explained by Cárdenas (2001).
7.2 The sources of growth
Table 2 and Figure 19 show the sources of growth in Colombia in selected
periods. The productivity slowdown appears as the mainelement explaining
the slower growth since 1975.
18Figures for …xed private investment are not easy to construct for a useful period.





















Figure 18: The Productivity Slowdown in Colombia
GDP Technolo- Growth Growth Growth
growth gical change of inputs of capital of labor
1950-1974 5.2 1.4 3.8 4.5 3.3
1975-2000 3.5 0.2 3.3 4.4 2.6
1975-1998 3.8 0.4 3.4 4.5 2.7
2001-2010 3.3 0.8 2.5 2.9 2.4
Table 2: The sources of growth 1950-2000 and projection 2001-2010




















Figure 19: The sources of growth in Colombia 1950-2000











Figure 20: Projection of the technology factor
7.3 Prospects for growth in the long run
Figures (20), (21) and (22) show the projection of technology, the share of
investment and the labor force.
In projecting the technology index, we assume it gradually converges to
a long run trend that grows at an annual rate of 0.4%, as observed since
1975 (Figure 20).
The share of investment grows linearly until 2004 when it reaches the
long run average of 18.3% (Figure 21).
In the projection of the labor force (Figure 22) the number of employees
evolves according to
Nt = (1¡ ut)ptPt (27)
where
Nt is the labor force
ut is the economy wide unemployment rate
pt is the participation rate
Pt is population.
In turn, Pt+1 = (1 + nt)Pt where nt is an exogenously given rate of
population growth.




























Figure 22: Projection of the labor force
527.4 The neoclassical growth model
The projection of output and the capital stock is obtained iterating the
system19:




The results for the growth of output and its sources are presented in the
last row of Table 2. Output growth is 3.4%, split into technology growth
(0.8%) and the growth of inputs (2.5%). Output and capital grow at a
rate that is higher than the one in the steady state because of the initial
conditions.
From Lucas (1988) the long run rate of output g may be written, g =
¹
(1¡®) + ¸ where ¹ is the rate of technological change, (1 ¡ ®) is the share
of labor in national income and ¸ is the (assumed constant) rate of growth
of the labor force. Output per worker (and output per capita for a constant
participation rate pt) grows at the rate
¹
(1¡®), as ® is a parameter, increases
in the rate of growth of output per capita are possible only with increases in
the rate of technological change. It is then misleading to place emphasis in
the share of investment since it is only a level e¤ect.
7.5 Potential output and the output gap









Yt is potential output
At is the Hodrick-Prescot …lter of the technology index, smoothing pa-
rameter 100.
Nt is the Hodrick-Prescot …lter of the labor force, smoothing parameter
100.
The long run levels of technology and the labor force are shownin Figure
23.
The output gap is calculated as:
yt = Yt ¡ Y
P
t
19An analytical solution of this model for ± = 0 is found in Lucas (1988). We assume
± = 0:04 and solve the system numerically.
20The capital stock and capacity utilization …gures were not …ltered because the recur-
sive nature of the algorithm makes small errors accumulate and even out only in the long
run.
53Labor force






















Figure 23: The long run of technology and the labor force
54The output gap




























of the CPI Inflation forecast for
every component of the CPI
ARIMA core inflation Core inflation
ARIMA CPI without food Nonfood inflation
ARIMA CPI without others CPI without others
Currently in
VAR development
Figure 25: Autoregressive Models
where Y P
t = log(YP
t ); Yt = log(Yt): It is shown in Figure 24. Di¤erent
levels of the output gap are obtained with di¤erent levels of the smoothing
parameter in the Hodrick-Prescot …lter.
8 Autorregresive Models
The auto-regressive models used in the Banco de la República are described
in Figure 25. Given the accuracy of ARIMA projections in the short run,
when running the MMT short run projections of the CPI or its components
are at times used as data directly observed.
Autorregresive projections for core in‡ation help judge whether the ex-
tent of price rigidities in the MMT is appropriate. Discrepancies may be
reconciled by calibrating the weights of the backward and forward looking
components in the Phillips curve.
Aimingatimprovingitsforecastingcapabilities, the BancodelaRepública
is currently developing some VAR models that may be used to forecast in-
‡ation.
569 Conclusions
Colombia started announcing in‡ation targets very early in the history of
the countries that have adopted in‡ation targeting: 1991. However, the
…rst in‡ation targets had more the character of a forecast within a program
of macroeconomic consistency rather than a hard overriding objective of
monetary policy.
Since the early 1990s the Constitution and the Law of the Banco de
la República established the legal framework that is appropriate for price
stability. The legal framework makes the central bank considerably indepen-
dent. It also states that the objective of the central bank is price stability,
that the central bank has to announce an in‡ation target once a year and
that the central bank is required to submit a report to Congress twice a
year.
Although the transition to in‡ation targeting has been gradual, the cur-
rent management of monetary policy has all the features of in‡ation target-
ing: a ‡oating exchange rate, central bank independence and accountabil-
ity, and quarterly In‡ation Report where monetary policy decisions are ex-
plained. The Banco de la República still monitors monetary aggregates and
de…nes indicator corridors for the monetary base. The monetary approach
can be a complement to the in‡ation targeting strategy while progress in
the development of the In‡ation Forecasting System is achieved.
In the last fewyears in‡ationdecreasedto one digit, a history ofa quarter
of a century of moderate in‡ation has ended, and since 1997 the in‡ation
targets have been met. Currently established in‡ation targets are decreasing
and a 3% long run target has been announced.
Giving support to economic analysis, macroeconomic models may help
improve the evaluation of future trends in in‡ation, the e¤ect on in‡ation
of new developments in the economy and the e¤ect on in‡ation of di¤erent
policies. This paper has presented the current state of the In‡ation Fore-
casting System of the Banco de la República, a set of macroeconomic and
econometric models that is constantly in development. There are several
topics in the research agenda and many improvements may be introduced
to the current system, including its simpli…cation. We hope this presenta-
tion of the in‡ation forecasting system as a whole may contribute to this
improvement.
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